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Comments
Prison Overcrowding as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment: Rhodes v. Chapman
The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) is a maxi-
mum security state prison built in the early 1970's.1 Respond-
ing to an increase in Ohio's state prison population, SOCF
began "double ceiling," placing two prisoners in cells designed
for one. By 1977, 1400 of the prison's 2300 inmates were sharing
cells of approximately sixty-three square feet. Respondents,
who shared a cell at the prison, brought a section 19832 class ac-
tion in federal court, alleging that double celling was cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment.3
The district court ruled for the respondents,4 and the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.5 The Supreme Court re-
1. SOCF is Ohio's only maximum security prison. Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 340 n.1 (1981).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
In 1962, the Supreme Court stated that the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962).
4. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977). The
court's decision rested on five considerations: (1) inmates at the prison were
serving long terms, id. at 1011; (2) the prison population exceeded its design
capacity by 38 percent, id. at 1020; (3) several studies recommended that each
inmate have at least 50-55 square feet of living space, id. at 1021; (4) the
double-celled inmates spent most of their time in their cells with their
cellmates, id. at 1013; and (5) the double celling was not a temporary condition,
id. at 1021.
5. Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099, 1099 (6th Cir. 1980). The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioner's argument that the district court decision must be
interpreted as holding that double celling is per se unconstitutional, and con-
cluded that the decision held only that double celling is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the circumstances at SOCF. Without a further opinion, the
court affirmed on the grounds that the district court findings were not clearly
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versed, holding that the double celling was not cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the eighth amendment. Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
The framers of the United States Constitution adopted the
language of the eighth amendment from the English Bill of
Rights of 1689.6 Historians disagree over whether the original
purpose of the English cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sion was to proscribe specific forms of barbarous punishment
or to prevent judges from imposing excessive sentences.7 It ap-
pears, however, that the drafters of the American Constitution
were primarily concerned with achieving the former objective.8
The Supreme Court first interpreted the cruel and unusual
punishment clause in 1879 in Wilkerson v. Utah.9 Although
holding that execution by firing squad was not a per se viola-
tion of the eighth amendment,10 the Court stated in dicta that
punishments of torture and "all others in the same line of un-
necessary cruelty are forbidden by [the eighth] amendment to
the Constitution."" Eleven years later in In re Kemmler,12 the
Court similarly stated that punishments were cruel and unu-
sual if they involved torture or lingering death, but that the
death penalty itself was not cruel, because the eighth amend-
ment prohibits only the "inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life."13
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the meaning
erroneous, the conclusions of law were permissible from the findings, and the
remedy was reasonable. Chapman v. Rhodes, No. 78-3365, slip op. (6th Cir.
1980).
6. Note, Constitutional Law--The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform,
51 N.C.L. REV. 1539, 1540 (1973). See also English Bill of Rights of 1689, re-
printed in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARcHAN, SouncEs OF ENGLISH CONSTrrTIONAL
HISTORY 599 (1937).
7. For an argument that the framers of the American Constitution misin-
terpreted the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 860-65 (1969).
8. See Clapp, Eighth Amendment Proportionality, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253,
258 (1979).
9. 99 U.S. 130 (1879). The Supreme Court did refer to the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause in a case twelve years earlier but did not define its
scope. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866).
10. 99 U.S. at 134-35.
11. Id. at 136. In Wilkerson, the Supreme Court stated that unconstitu-
tional forms of punishment included being "embowelled alive, beheaded,...
quartered, . . . public disection . . . and burning alive." Id. at 135.
12. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
13. Id. at 447. The Court upheld a New York state statute providing for ex-
ecution by electrocution, which the legislature decided was a more humane
means of death than hanging. Id. at 443.
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of the eighth amendment. In Weems v. United States,14 the
Court for the first time invalidated a penalty prescribed by a
legislature.15 In Weems, the defendant had been sentenced to
fifteen years at hard labor in chains for falsifying public docu-
ments.16 The Court rejected the contention that the eighth
amendment prohibits only inhumane and barbarous forms of
punishment, finding that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause also encompasses punishments disproportionate to the
severity of the offense.' 7 Fifty years later, the Warren Court
further broadened the meaning of the eighth amendment in
Trop v. Dulles,18 stating that the amendment "Must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."' 9 The Court held that the loss
of citizenship for wartime desertion was cruel and unusual
punishment because denationalization involves "total destruc-
tion of a person's status in an organized society."20
Judicial interpretation of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause has thus evolved from a proscription against spe-
cific forms of torture to a protection against punishment
inconsistent with evolving notions of dignity and human de-
cency. During the past decade, the federal courts have strug-
gled to identify these "evolving standards of decency" in the
face of eighth amendment challenges to conditions within
prisons.
The federal courts traditionally demonstrated a "hands off"
approach towards correctional administration.2 ' One reason for
14. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
15. Id. at 381-82.
16. Id. at 357-58.
17. Id. at 381. The Court stated that the framers surely assumed that there
could be exercises of cruelty in punishment other than those that inflicted bod-
ily pain or mutilation. Id. at 372-73. Referring to the general language of the
eighth amendment, the Court stated that it "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice." Id. at 378. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the fifteen-year sen-
tence at hard labor was cruel, because it was excessive in relation to the
offense. Id. at 377.
18. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
19. Id. at 101.
20. Id. at 101-02. In Trop, the Court also noted that the word "unusual" ad-
ded nothing to the meaning of the eighth amendment other than to signify
"something different from that which is generally done." Id. at 100-01 n.32.
Thus, ultimately the basic issue facing the Trop court was whether there was
inhumane treatment without regard to any subtleties suggested by the word
"unusual." Id.
21. The term "hands off" originated in a Federal Bureau of Prisons docu-
ment. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 n.4 (1963).
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this deference was the lack of judicial expertise in the field of
penology.22 Another justification was the fear that judicial in-
tervention would seriously undermine prison discipline by sub-
jecting every exercise of prison authority to public and judicial
criticism. 23 Furthermore, some courts were concerned that in-
tervention would open the floodgates for litigation of prisoner
grievances. 24 Judges were also convinced that the problem of
poor prison conditions required legislative and executive,
rather than judicial, solutions. 25 Finally, judicial deference to
state prison administration recognized that in a federal system
of government, the administration of prisons is primarily a mat-
ter of state and not federal concern.2 6
By the late 1960's, judicial deference to state correctional
administration began to erode in response to scholarly criti-
cism and growing public awareness of American prison condi-
tions.2 7  Courts extended previously denied constitutional
22. See, e.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(dictum); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1949). See gener-
ally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 175, 181-82 (1970); Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An
Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands Ogd" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795,
806-10.
23. See, e.g., Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953); Siegel v. Ragen,
88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. IlM 1949). See generally Haas, supra note 22, at 810-21.
24. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm,
J., concurring); McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1193-94 (D. Md. 1973),
rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 433 (D.
Md. 1966). See generally Haas, supra note 22, at 821-29.
The feared flood of litigation apparently materialized. Following the deci-
sion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), permitting state prisoners to seek
section 1983 relief in federal district courts without first exhausting state reme-
dies, the number of prisoner petitions brought under section 1983 increased
1200 percent from 1966 to 1971. Haas, supra note 22, at 823 (citing figures from
1976 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTs 93-96).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965);
Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949); Lewis v. Gladden, 230 F.
Supp. 786, 788 (D. Ore. 1964). See generally Haas, supra note 22, at 798-803.
26. See, e.g., Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 887 (1966); Oregon v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1957); Siegel v.
Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788-89 (7th Cir. 1950). See generally Haas, supra note 22, at
803-06.
27. See Klein, Prisoners' Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A
Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 7 FoRDHAm URn. L.J. 1, 9 (1978). Klein argues that the violence and
news coverage of the Attica and San Quentin riots increased public awareness
of the plight of the imprisoned and eventually contributed towards a change in
judicial attitudes. Id. See also Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel
and Unusual Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal In-
stitutions, 23 HASTiNGS L. J. 1111, 1112-13 (1972).
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guarantees to prisoners.2 8 Finally, the Supreme Court rejected
the hands off approach to state prison administration in 1974,
stating that "[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will dis-
charge their duty to protect constitutional rights."29 This aban-
donment of judicial restraint prompted many prisoners to
challenge the conditions of their confinement as cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the eighth amendment.3 0
Initially, the federal courts found there was cruel and unu-
sual punishment only when individual prison practices endan-
gered the life or health of particular prisoners.31 In 1971,
however, courts began to consider whether the aggregate of
prison conditions, which individually might not be unconstitu-
tional, was sufficient to constitute an eighth amendment viola-
tion.32 This "totality of the conditions" approach recognized
that prison conditions have a cumulative impact on the pris-
28. For example, courts upheld inmates' first amendment rights to practice
religion and due process rights to court access. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (holding that, in the absence of a reasonable alternative, a
state may not validly enforce a regulation that bars inmates from furnishing
assistance to other illiterate or poorly educated inmates in preparation of peti-
tions for post-conviction relief); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per
curiam) (upholding inmate's right to bring an action against the prison for re-
stricting his right to practice religion by denying him permission to purchase
certain religious publications).
In the past many courts refused to recognize that prisoners had any consti-
tutional rights. See, e.g., Ruflin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796
(1871) (A convicted felon forfeits not only his liberty "but all his personal
rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the
time being a slave of the state.").
29. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974). Later that year, the
Court, in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), concluded that an inmate's first
amendment rights may be limited in light of the state's objectives of rehabilita-
tion and internal security. Nevertheless, the Court held that a prisoner retains
those first amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a pris-
oner or with legitimate penal objectives. Id. at 826.
30. Prisoners most often asserted their eighth amendment rights under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1980), see Comment, Cruel But Not
So Unusual Punishment- The Role of the Federal Judiciary in State Prison Re-
form, 7 CuM. L. REv. 31, 34-35 (1976). Prisoners have alternatively invoked the
federal habeas corpus statutes or have brought tort actions against prison or
state officials. Id.
31. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 311-12 (E.D. Va. 1972);
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Blythe v. Ellis, 194 F.
Supp. 139, 140 (S.D. Tex. 1961). See also Note, A Review of Prisoners' Rights
Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 11 U. RicH. L. REV. 803, 872 (1977); Note,
Eighth Amendment Challenges to Conditions of Confinement: State Prison Re-
form by Federal Judicial Decree, 18 WAsnBuRN L.J. 288, 292-93 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Eighth Amendment Challenges].
32. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
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oner that could result in cruel and unusual punishment.3 3
Although the federal courts considered aggregate prison
conditions in eighth amendment cases after 1971, they hesi-
tated to formulate exact standards for determining when those
conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In 1972,
Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,3 4 attempted
to focus eighth amendment analysis by enunciating four tests
of cruel and unusual punishment: (1) whether the punishment
was degrading to the "dignity of man"; (2) whether the punish-
ment was inordinately severe and arbitrarily inflicted;
(3) whether the punishment was rejected by contemporary so-
ciety; and (4) whether the punishment exceeded what was
necessary to achieve a legitimate penal purpose. 35
In the prison condition cases, courts have reformulated
Justice Brennan's tests into two lihes of analysis.36 First,
courts have compared prison conditions to "metaphysical"
standards of human dignity or the contemporary conscience of
the community.37 Second, courts have asked whether the con-
ditions serve any utilitarian purpose by advancing generally ac-
cepted penal objectives.3 8 The specific tests used to determine
when prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment are essentially variants of the metaphysical or utilitarian
33. The Holt court stated.
The distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary life must be con-
sidered together. One cannot consider separately a trusty system, a
system in which men are combined together in large numbers in open
barracks, bad conditions in isolation cells, or an absence of a meaning-
ful program of rehabilitation. All of those things exist in combination;
each affects the other; and taken together they have a cumulative im-
pact on the inmates regardless of their status.
Id. at 373. For a further discussion of the "totality of the conditions" approach,
see Eighth Amendment Challenges, supra note 31, at 293-97.
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furma, appellants challenged the constitution-
ality of the death penalty.
35. 408 U.S. at 257-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. A third strand of eighth amendment analysis examines whether the
punishment is disproportionate to the severity of the crime. See supra notes
14-17 and accompanying text. This analysis is used more often, however, in de-
termining whether a particular sentence is excessive, rather than whether gen-
eral prison conditions are cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). Courts have used this analysis when consider-
ing the sanction of solitary confinement, which is similar to an original sentenc-
ing because it involves a further punishment for a further violation. See, e.g.,
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 646-47 (E.D. Va. 1971); Carothers v. Fol-
lette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
37. See Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement- An
Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Ad-
ministration Under the Eighth Amendment 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 902-03 (1970).
38. Id. at 904-06.
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lines of analysis. For example, the "shock-the-conscience" test
merely states the conclusion that the punishment grossly vio-
lates community standards of decency or dignity.3 9 The "evolv-
ing standards of decency" test reflects the observation that
community standards develop more sensitivity over time.40
Under the "totality of the conditions" test the courts aggregate
the harms before determining whether the common conscience
or human dignity is violated.41 Similarly, the "least restrictive
means" test, which requires rejection of a punishment if less
severe penalties adequately serve legitimate penal objectives,4 2
and the "balancing" test, which weighs the competing interests
of the prisoner and the state in pursuing a valid penological
goal,43 are utilitarian tests.
Since the federal courts were unable to agree upon the
proper analysis, inconsistent decisions resulted when they ap-
plied these tests individually and in different combinations.
The resulting inconsistency among federal court decisions and
the inherent subjectivity of these cruel and unusual punish-
ment tests combined to produce little guidance for the courts.44
In response, a number of courts adopted specific minimum con-
stitutional standards for prison conditions. 45 For example, in
the area of overcrowding, some courts rejected vague standards
39. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affid, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
40. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
41. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
42. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting);
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
43. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977), modified sub noma. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
44. The inherent subjectivity in eighth amendment analysis has received
considerable criticism. The subjectivity of a judge's moral outrage prevents the
formation of guidelines for prison authorities to follow because it provides
nothing in the way of workable constitutional standards. See Robbins & Buser,
supra note 37, at 902-03; Note, supra note 31, at 860-61.
45. Specific minimum standards have been ordered for a wide range of
prison conditions including- (1) development of remedial education and voca-
tional training programs, e.g., Barnes v. Government of V.L, 415 F. Supp. 1218,
1232 (D. St. Croix 1976); (2) recreation programs, e.g., Laaman v. Helgemore,
437 F. Supp. 269, 330 (D.N.H. 1977); (3) heating and ventilation systems, e.g.,
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 987 (D.L 1977), affd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); (4) cell sanitation and furnishings, e.g.,
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. at 987; (5) insect and rodent control, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Untrenier, 421 F. Supp. 886, 898 (N.D. Fla. 1976); (6) food storage,
e.g., Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 553 (E.D. La. 1972); (7) personal
hygiene articles, e.g., Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 596
(D.P.R. 1976), a2fd, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); (8) drug treatment programs, e.g.,
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Tex., 406 F. Supp. 649, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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of decency and dignity, and recognized that prisoners have a
constitutional right to a specific minimum area of living space.46
During the last decade, the absence of Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding prison conditions added to the confusion sur-
rounding the punishment clause.47 In Estelle v. Gamble,48 the
Supreme Court's only pre-Rhodes ruling upon the eighth
amendment rights of convicted prisoners, the Court held that
"deliberate indifference" to an inmate's medical needs was
cruel and unusual punishment.49 The "deliberate indifference"
concept has been strongly criticized, however, because it seems
to require malicious intent on the part of prison officials to find
an eighth amendment violation.50 The Estelle Court's test for
cruel and unusual punishment in the prison context was essen-
tially a reiteration of formulations used in earlier eighth
amendment decisions, and consequently did little to clarify the
analysis. The Court ultimately relied upon language from
Gregg v. Georgia,51 an earlier capital punishment decision, in
concluding that deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs constituted "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
and therefore violated the eighth amendment.52
The Supreme Court did not discuss the principles relevant
to assessing claims of unconstitutional prison conditions until
46. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 447 F. Supp. 516, 525 (E.D. Okla. 1977),
afid, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (60 square feet); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443
F. Supp. 956, 987 (D.R.L 1977), a.f'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
839 (1980) (60 square feet).
Recognition of specific constitutional rights necessitated detailed remedial
proscriptions which prompted the courts to engage in unprecedented interven-
tion in state prison administration. This intervention has reignited debate over
the propriety of judicial involvement in prison affairs, a debate which charac-
terized the earlier hands off era. See generally Robbins & Buser, supra note 37;
Comment, supra note 30, at 53-60.
47. Although Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), was a prison conditions
case, the state prison administrators did not dispute that conditions at the
prison were cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 685. Hence, the Court did
not have to consider the principles relevant to an eighth amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court also assessed the constitutionality of confinement con-
ditions at a correctional facility in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The
Court in Bell, however, focused on the rights of pretrial detainees and analyzed
the case in terms of due process. This Comment focuses on the eighth amend-
ment rights of convicted prisoners. For a discussion of the rights of pretrial de-
tainees, see Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970).
48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
49. Id. at 104.
50. See Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972); Pugh v. Locke, 406
F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
51. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
52. 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
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its 1981 decision in Rhodes v. Chapman.53 The issue in Rhodes
was whether double celling at an Ohio state prison constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.54
As in Estelle, the Rhodes majority adopted its eighth amend-
ment test in part from the Gregg decision, stating that cruel
and unusual punishment includes "'unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain'"55 and punishments "grossly disproportion-
ate to the severity of the crime."56 The Court added that prison
conditions must be judged according to "'evolving standards of
decency.'- 57  Moreover, the Court stated that eighth amend-
ment judgments should not simply be based upon the subjec-
tive views of judges; instead, objective factors should be
considered as much as possible.58
In applying the eighth amendment test to the facts of
Rhodes, the majority concluded that the respondents failed to
demonstrate that the conditions at the prison inflicted the level
of pain necessary to justify a finding that double celling was
cruel and unusual punishment.59 With the exception of over-
crowding, the conditions at the prison appeared satisfactory.60
The district court found no deprivations of essential food, medi-
cal care, or sanitation 6l and described the prison's physical
plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class facility."62 Con-
cluding that there was no constitutional violation at SOCF, the
majority stated that the district court had no authority to deter-
mine whether double celling was the best solution to the state's
53. 452 U.S. at 345-47.
54. Id. at 340.
55. Id. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
58. 452 U.S. at 346.
59. Id. at 347-48. The Court concluded that virtually all of the district
court's findings tended to refute, rather than support, the respondents' claim of
cruel and unusual punishment.
60. The district court made an unannounced inspection of SOCF, finding
that the food, air ventilation system, and temperature in the cells were ade-
quate. The noise was not excessive, nor was there any offensive odor. Space in
the day rooms and visitation facilities was not significantly reduced. There was
no evidence of indifference to the inmates' medical or dental care. Finally, the
ratio of guards to inmates was acceptable and the number of acts of violence
had increased only in proportion to the increase in population. Id. at 342-43.
61. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1013-16 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
62. Id. at 1009. The Rhodes majority summarily stated that because there
was no evidence that the double celing inflicted pain or was grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment, the five considera-
tions used by the district court, see supra note 4, fell short of establishing cruel
and unusual punishment. 452 U.S. at 347-48. Assuming that all the other condi-
tions were satisfactory, Rhodes arguably represents a decision on the constitu-
tionality of overcrowding itselfl
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growing prison population. According to the majority, such de-
terminations properly belong to the legislature and prison ad-
ministration, not the courts. 63
The Rhodes Court's reliance upon the test from Gregg and
its emphasis upon the concept of pain in eighth amendment
analysis raise two fundamental issues which have important
implications for future prison overcrowding cases. The issues
are: what constitutes pain for the purpose of cruel and unusual
punishment analysis, and when is the infliction of pain consti-
tutionally impermissible under the eighth amendment?
The Rhodes majority failed to address squarely the ques-
tion of whether mental and emotional harm incident to over-
crowding constitutes pain in eighth amendment analysis. In
reviewing the prison conditions, the majority simply concluded
that there was no evidence that double celling at SOCF in-
flicted unnecessary and wanton pain.6 4 Moreover, the majority
rejected the respondents' theory that the close confinement of
double celling creates a dangerous potential for violence, which
can inflict pain if it results in rioting.65 Although a serious con-
cern, the Court stated that the danger of rioting did not show
actual cruel and unusual punishment at the prison.66 The ma-
jority ultimately found that the lack of an increase in the rate
of violence since the double celing began refuted the respon-
dents' argument.67 By focusing on threatened violence, the ma-
jority did not address significantly the other detrimental effects
of overcrowding 68 and left open the question of whether these
effects alone could constitute pain within the cruel and unusual
punishment analysis.
The cruel and unusual punishment clause no longer merely
proscribes the infliction of physical pain. Although the termi-
nation of citizenship involves no physical mistreatment, the
Supreme Court held in Trop v. Dulles that the eighth amend-
ment barred denationalization. 69 The Court concluded that this
63. 452 U.S. at 349. In dicta, the majority cautioned that in discharging its
responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, courts cannot as-
sume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to constitutional
requirements or to the problem of how best to achieve the goals of the penal
system. Id. at 352.
64. Id. at 347-48. See also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 349 -n.14.
66. Id.
67. Id. at n.15. See supra note 60.
68. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
69. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 18-20.
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form of punishment, the destruction of an individual's status in
society, was "more primitive than torture."70 Similarly, in re-
cent prison condition decisions, many federal courts have
equated pain with deterioration of a prisoner's mental and
emotional well-being-a notion of self-degeneration.7 1 These
courts reasoned that inmates have an eighth amendment right
to be imprisoned under conditions which do not threaten their
sanity or mental well-being, which are not counterproductive to
inmates' efforts to rehabilitate themselves, and which do not in-
crease the probability of future incarceration.7 2 In addition,
some courts have demanded that the prison environment must
prevent degeneration of mental and social skills already pos-
sessed.7 3 Incarceration under conditions causing psychological
deterioration frustrates society's penological objectives,7 4 fos-
ters recidivism,75 and is repugnant to contemporary standards
of decency.7 6 Psychological deterioration must therefore be in-
cluded within the concept of pain for the purpose of cruel and
unusual punishment analysis.
Courts have examined psychological damage to inmates
when considering challenges to the practice of solitary confine-
ment. Although courts are generally reluctant to hold segrega-
tion to be per se cruel and unusual punishment, they have
70. Id. at 101.
71. See Battle v. Anderson, 447 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Okla.), affd, 564 F.2d 388,
403 (10th Cir. 1977); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I 1977);
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 307 (D.N.H. 1977).
72. Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 316 (D.N.H. 1977). See Nelson v.
Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D. Md. 1978); Barnes v. Government of the V.L,
415 F. Supp. 1218, 1226 (D. St. Croix 1976); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177,
1181 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
Most courts, however, are reluctant to assert that a prisoner has a constitu-
tional right to rehabilitation in the sense that the prisoner has an affirmative
right to leave prison as a well adjusted, law abiding citizen. See Nelson v. Col-
lins, 455 F. Supp. at 735; Battle v. Anderson, 447 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Okla.), a2f"d,
564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. at 316; Pugh
v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
73. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1978).
74. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
75. See infra note 96.
76. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
("[S]ubjecting a prisoner to the demonstrated risk of the loss of his sanity as
punishment for any offense in prison is plainly cruel and unusual punishment
as judged by present standards of decency.").
Although the public may appear apathetic regarding prison reform, studies
indicate that most persons are appalled when they discover the conditions
which really exist. Poor prison conditions are usually the result of neglect, and
not of conscious affirmative public policy. Comment, Confronting the Condi-
tions of Confinement- An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HAnv.
CR.-C.L. L. REv. 367, 379-81 (1977).
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examined the effects of isolation upon a prisoner's psychologi-
cal functioning and have ordered release when the individual
prisoner has undergone psychological distress.7 7 These eighth
amendment decisions were based upon overwhelming psychi-
atric and psychological evidence documenting the debilitating
mental effects of social isolation and sensory deprivation.7 8
Similarly, substantial empirical evidence verifies the detri-
mental effects of prison overcrowding. Prisoners subjected to
sustained overcrowding have a higher death and suicide rate,
more disciplinary problems, and a larger number of illness
complaints than those not overcrowded.7 9 In addition, cramped
quarters increase tension, hostility, and aggression.8 0 There
are also significant correlations between overcrowding and de-
77. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); Berch v.
Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412, 420 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp.
674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
78. See Note, Solitary Confinement-Punishment Within the Letter of the
Law, or Psychological Torture?, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 223, 230.
79. See G. McCAIN, V. Cox & P. PAULUS, THE EFFEcT OF PRISON CROWDING
ON INMATE BEHAVIOR iii-vii (1980) (study by the University of Texas at Arling-
ton under a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice). The study, which examined data from 1400 inmates in six federal
prisons, revealed that tolerance of crowded conditions does not improve with
time. Most inmates functioned better and were more satisfied in single cells
with fewer square feet per person than in two-person cells or dormitories
where they had more square feet per person. The inmates studied viewed per-
sonal privacy as their highest priority. Id.
Another study of 247 inmates in a federal correctional facility and a county
jail revealed that inmates in one or two-person cells had fewer illness com-
plaints than inmates in dormitories. McCain, Cox & Paulus, The Relationship
Between Illness Complaints and Degree of Crowding in a Prison Environmen
8 ENV'T & BEHAV. 283, 286 (1976).
Furthermore, a study of the Federal Correctional Institution at Tallahassee,
Florida, found a significant correlation between the space available for inmates
and the rate and number of rule infractions. Megargee, The Association of Pop-
ulation Density, Reduced Space, and Uncomfortable Temperatures with Miscon-
duct in a Prison Community, 5 Am. J. COMMUNrrY PSYCHOLOGY 289 (1977).
80. See Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520
F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1975) (Expert testimony indicated that confinement of two
inmates together is "psychologically destructive and increases homosexual im-
pulses, tensions, and aggressive tendencies."); Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp.
802, 810-11 (D. Ore. 1980) (Dr. Thomas Gualitieri, a psychiatrist associated with
the University of North Carolina Medical School, testified that severe over-
crowding "prevents the development of appropriate social skills and leads in-
stead to aggressive, violent, and destructive behavior patterns." Dr. Verne Cox,
a psychology professor at the University of Texas at Arlington, testified that
"studies of penal institutions reveal that overcrowding lead to depression, ten-
sion, and increases in disciplinary infractions, assaults, and suicide attempts.");
Jordan v. Wolke, 460 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (expert witness testi-
fied that "multiple occupant cells not only deprive inmates of privacy but lead
to aggressiveness and tension which can cause security problems."); Anderson
v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 .(D. Del. 1977) (adverse mental and emotional
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pression and assaults. 81 Furthermore, the psychological harm
from overcrowding is not limited to the period of confinement
but may remain after the prisoners are released.82 Given these
verified detrimental effects of crowded prison conditions upon a
prisoner's mental and emotional health, courts cannot legiti-
mately deny that these effects fall within the concept of pain
cognizable under the eighth amendment. Furthermore, Justice
Brennan in his Rhodes concurrence appears to support the ar-
gument that the infliction of psychological pain incident to
overcrowding can be cruel and unusual punishment. According
to Justice Brennan, the respondents merely failed to establish
evidence of actual psychological harm from the double celling,
effects of overcrowding evidenced by disproportionate increase in the number
of self-inflicted injuries, suicides, and attempted suicides).
Two studies reveal the physiological signs of tension typically produced in
people living in overcrowded conditions. The first study compared blood pres-
sure levels of inmates who were housed in crowded dormitories with those in
individual or two-person cells. The test results showed that systolic blood pres-
sure was significantly higher for inmates in dormitories. D'Atri, Psychological
Responses to Crowding, 7 ENV'T & BEHAV. 237, 242 (1975). See also Paulus, Mc-
Cain & Cox, Death Rates, Psychiatric Commitments, Blood Pressure, and Per-
ceived Crowding as a Function of Institutional Crowding, 3 ENVTL.
PSYCHOLOGY & NONVERBAL BEHAV. 107 (1978). The second study demonstrated
that palmar sweat readings, a stress measure, were higher for men housed in
dense quarters on a drilling platform. Co, Paulus, McCain & Schkade, Field
Research on the Effects of Crowding in Prisons and on Offshore Drilling Plat-
forms in RESIDENTIAL CRowDiNG AND DESIGN 95 (1979). For more information
on the effects of population density, see generally Calhoun, Population Density
and Social Pathology, Scx. AM., Feb. 1962, at 139; Griffitt & Veitch, Hot and
Crowded: Influences of Population Density and Temperature on Interpersonal
Affective Behavior, 17 J. PERSONALIrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 92 (1971).
81. See Jan, Overcrowding and Inmate Behavior: Some Preliminary Find-
ings, 7 Cnmx. JUST. & BEHAv. 293 (1980). A study of four Florida state prisons
found significant positive correlations between assault rates, monthly incidents
per one thousand inmates, and the overcrowding index, monthly population di-
vided by normal prison capacity, for inmates in youthful offender and male
older age offender prisons. Id. at 298. The study also revealed negative correla-
tions between the overcrowding index and various constructive behaviors in-
cluding the number of inmates paroled, number of inmates granted mandatory
conditional release, and the rate of books checked out by inmates. Id. at 299.
See also Nacci, Prather & Teitelbaum, Population Density and Inmate Miscon-
duct Rates in the Federal Prison System, FED. PROBATION, June 1977, at 26, 26-
31. A study of thirty-seven institutions in the federal prison system examined
the relationship of density and misconduct by correlating a density index, the
average daily population divided by the physical or design capacity, with physi-
cal assaults. Overall correlations revealed a significant association between
density and total assaults and assaults on inmates. "The relationship indicates
that high density is associated with high rates of assaultiveness . . . 2" Id. at
29.
82. In Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980), Dr. Thomas Guali-
tieri, a psychiatrist, testified that "the aggressive behavior patterns that develop
among prisoners as a result of overcrowding remain after prisoners are re-
leased." Id. at 812. See supra note 81.
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relying instead on a generalized theory of potential violence.8 3
Justice Brennan's statements imply that the prisoner must in-
troduce some evidence of actual harm resulting from the over-
crowding to show an eighth amendment violation.
Because the Supreme Court decided Rhodes solely on the
threshold issue of whether there was any infliction of pain, the
Court never reached the question of when the infliction of pain
is impermissible under the eighth amendment. The issue of
when the infliction of pain is unconstitutional depends upon
both a utilitarian analysis that determines whether the pain is
unnecessary to further legitimate penal objectives, 84 and a se-
verity analysis that determines whether the pain exceeds toler-
able thresholds.85 If the infliction of pain is both unnecessary
and too severe, it should be found unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has defined the unnecessary infliction
of pain as that which is "totally without penological justifica-
tion."86 Courts examining penological justification engage in a
purposive or means-end analysis, which requires that a punish-
ment or prison condition advance legitimate penal objectives.87
The basic penal objectives of punishment traditionally have in-
83. 452 U.S. at 367-68 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan stated that while
double celling specifically and prison overcrowding generally may result in se-
rious harm, the Court is obligated to examine the "actual effects" of challenged
conditions. Id. The exact meaning of this requirement is unclear. Brennan did
cite two cases in which there was substantial evidence of deleterious effects of
overcrowding at the facility under attack, suggesting that a similar showing and
quantum of evidence would suffice to establish "actual harm." Id. at 368 n.17.
Brennan also noted that injury to inmates need not be demonstrated with a
high degree of specificity or certainty, and that courts may "employ common
sense, observation, expert testimony, and other practical modes of proof." Id.
at 367 n.16.
In an analogous dispute involving the constitutionality of solitary confine-
ment, the Second Circuit concluded that because there was no clear evidence
of psychological damage, there could be no finding of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193 n.24 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972). As one commentator observed, the implication of Sostre is
that if "Sostre could prove psychological damage to himself, or if the evidence
at trial overwhelmingly showed that isolation caused psychological injury," the
solitary confinement per se would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Benjamin & Lux, Constitutional and Psychological Implications of the Use of
Solitary Confinement: Experience at the Maine State Prison, 9 CLEARMGHOUSE
Rav. 83, 87 (1975).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 86-98.
85. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
86. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
87. See, e.g., Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F. Supp. 119, 122 (D.D.C.
1976); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971). For an ex-
tended discussion of the purposive analysis of incarceration, see Comment,
supra note 76, at 393-404.
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cluded isolation, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.88
Under a purposive analysis the state must demonstrate that
specific prison conditions or practices further one or more of
these penal objectives. 89
The infliction of pain incident to prison overcrowding
serves none of society's generally recognized penal objectives. 90
The aim of isolation is to protect society from dangerous
criminals. After the prisoner is incapacitated, overcrowding
does not advance this end.9' Moreover, overcrowded institu-
tions seriously endanger internal prison security.92 Over-
crowded conditions would only rationally serve society's
interest in retribution if those convicted of the most serious of-
fenses were put in the most crowded facilities. 93 This is not the
case. Furthermore, confinement in overcrowded prisons does
not advance the interest of rehabilitation; instead it frustrates
that goal.94 Finally, no evidence suggests that overcrowded
prisons serve to deter criminal conduct.95 In fact, such condi-
tions probably promote recidivism.96
A separate argument justifying the necessity of pain inci-
dent to overcrowding is the lack of adequate funding to remedy
the problem. Although this argument raises fundamental prac-
tical concerns, the courts have consistently rejected this justifi-
88. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1964); United States v. Akers,
499 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D. Or. 1980). The Supreme Court also said that the mainte-
nance of internal prison security is an objective of the correctional system. Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
89. See id. at 822.
90. See Comment, supra note 76, at 399-401.
91. Id. at 399.
92. Id. at 400.
93. Id. at 399.
94. Id. See generally Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (10th Cir.
1977); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978).
95. Comment, supra note 76, at 399-400.
96. A 1978 study of prisons in England and Wales revealed a high negative
correlation between overcrowding and effectiveness, indicating that reconvic-
tion rates are highly correlated with prison overcrowding. See Farrington &
Nuttall, Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIm.
JUST. 221, 228-30 (1980). As another study noted, the degrading conditions of
many prisons only enhance the prisoners' disrespect for the legal system. The
study explained:
Life in many institutions is at best barren and futile, at worst un-
speakably brutal and degrading. To be sure, the offenders in such in-
stitutions are incapacitated from committing further crimes while
serving their sentences, but the conditions in which they live are the
poorest possible preparation for their successful reentry into society,
and often merely reinforces in them a pattern of manipulation or
destructiveness.
PRESIDENT'S CoMm'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967).
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cation for unconstitutional conditions of confinement.9 7 As
Justice Blackmun stated while serving on the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, "[H]uman considerations and consititu-
tional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or lim-
ited by dollar considerations."98
Not every incident of unnecessary infliction of pain, how-
ever, is unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause. Incarceration inevitably involves harsh
restrictions and discomfort.99 Courts have consistently exper-
ienced difficulty in determining when the pain is sufficiently se-
vere, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has maintained that this question must be de-
cided by the courts. 00
Expert opinion in the prison reform area provides the best
factual basis for determining constitutional standards for
pain.101 Because psychological pain is harder to establish than
physical pain, deciding When prison conditions become intoler-
able is often beyond the common knowledge of laypersons and
courts.02 The continued utility of the shock-the-conscience
type of test is highly suspect when the manifestations of pain
are less obvious.103
In an analogous situation involving solitary confinement,
the courts' initial refusal to recognize expert psychiatric and
97. See, e.g., Barnes v. Government of the VI., 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1227 (D.
St. Croix 1976); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
98. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968).
99. The Rhodes majority stated that harsh conditions are part of the price
criminals must pay for their crimes. 452 U.S. at 347.
100. Id. at 376 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. One commentator has advocated that the courts adopt the recom-
mended standards proposed by the American Correctional Association (ACA)
as constitutional minima for compliance with the eighth amendment. The ACA
Manual represents a compilation of expert knowledge in the corrections field
and reflects contemporary penological research. Note, Prison Discipline and
the Eighth Amendment: A Psychological Perspective, 43 U. C'NN. L. REV. 101,
128 (1974).
102. Generally, whether the situation is appropriate for the use of expert
testimony is to be determined on the basis of whether it assists the trier of fact
in its decision. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952).
103. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 37, at 902-03. The authors state:
Despite its flexibility, however, the "shock the conscience" test is
effective only when the features of confinement are so readily discerni-
ble as to evoke predictable human affections. The value of the test di-
minishes critically when such subtly effective penalties as prison
conditions that may affect their victims over long periods of time are
involved.
Id. (footnote omitted). Psychological extirpation as a result of imprisonment
may involve greater anguish than many forms of corporal punishment. Id. at
903 n.68.
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psychological evidence relating to isolation was a major obsta-
cle to finding that solitary confinement could be cruel and unu-
sual punishment.104 This attitude changed, however, when
courts, focusing on both the psychological and physical effects
of solitary confinement, exhibited a willingness to interpret the
eighth amendment in light of contemporary psychological
knowledge.105 Recognizing their lack of expertise in evaluating
psychological evidence, the courts relied upon outside sources
for experience and expertise.106 Overcrowding is very similar
to the practice of solitary confinement. Although neither in-
volve any direct physical mistreatment, there is persuasive evi-
dence that both practices inflict serious psychological
damage. 0 7 Given the nature of the harm involved, the courts'
competency to assess intelligently the severity of the detrimen-
tal effects is questionable in the absence of expert opinion.
Probably the most disturbing aspect of the Rhodes decision
was the majority's language disparaging the role of expert testi-
mony in determining the nature and extent of the harms
caused by overcrowding. The majority stated that expert opin-
ions "simply do not establish the constitutional minima; rather,
they establish goals recommended by the organization in ques-
tion."108 According to the Court, "generalized opinions of ex-
perts cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary
standards of decency as the public attitude toward a given
sanction."109
Both Justice Brennan's concurring and Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinions criticized the majority's deprecation of ex-
pert testimony. Justice Brennan argued that the courts must
be open to evidence and assistance from many sources, includ-
ing expert testimony and studies on the effect of particular con-
ditions on prisoners." 0 Justice Marshall similarly stated that a
court faced with a claim of cruel and unusual punishment
would want to know the findings of studies focusing on the ef-
fect of the specific punishment. Whether the effect was of un-
constitutional dimensions and whether the study was
104. See Note, supra note 78, at 230-31.
105. Id.
106. Id. Another commentator stated, "Certainly modern courts can no
longer close their eyes to sound psychiatric and psychological evidence which
indicates that solitary confinement, absent any aggravating factors or physical
abuse, can destroy a man." Note, supra note 31, at 869.
107. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
108. 452 U.S. at 348 n.13.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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competent would remain questions for the court to decide. In
Rhodes, however, the majority simply ignored the expert opin-
ion presented "without even a token evaluation of the method-
ology, content, or results.""'
The difficulty of establishing the effects of overcrowding
makes expert opinion not only desirable, but virtually indispen-
sable.1 1 2 The Court's reluctance to take cognizance of bona fide
social psychological studies constitutes a default in judicial re-
sponsibility to protect the eighth amendment rights of prison-
ers in the face of state correctional budget cutting, and heralds
the resurrection of the hands off approach.
Because the Rhodes decision failed to provide a clear stan-
dard to lower federal courts faced with determining when over-
crowded prison conditions violate the eighth amendment, the
following standard is recommended: overcrowding constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment when the harm caused by such
overcrowding is so severe that it substantially impedes gener-
ally recognized penal objectives. This proposed rule substi-
tutes the concept of harm for the concept of pain to emphasize
that detrimental psychological as well as physical effects can
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the con-
cept of pain in eighth amendment analysis is an undesirable
carryover from the early history of the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause. It fails to reflect the evolution of the clause" 3
and the increased awareness that certain prison conditions can
slowly and subtly debilitate a person. The proposed rule also
avoids the subjectiveness of a shock-the-conscience test, and
permits a more objective rational analysis into whether condi-
tions advance specifically identified penal interests. Requiring
111. Id. at 376 n.89 (Marshail, J., dissenting). Marshall also noted the influ-
ence of expert opinion in other contexts. For instance, in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), the Supreme Court relied upon expert stud-
ies showing the psychological harm to black children resulting from segrega-
tion, in holding that segregation was unconstitutional. Id. at 495.
The "Brandeis brief" is another example of the persuasive use of expert
studies and opinions. The term refers to an appellate brief which cites social,
scientific, and economic studies in addition to legal precedents and principles.
Louis Brandeis successfully used this type of brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908), in which the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an Oregon stat-
ute prohibiting employment of women for more than ten hours during any day.
See id. at 419 n.1. The Court decided that the law was a justifiable protective
measure for women on the basis of a compilation of studies, regarding the ef-
fects of long hours on women workers' health. Id. at 422-23.
112. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
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the courts to rationalize prison practices in terms of penal
objectives would also force courts to debate and to articulate
the legitimate goals of punishment.
This suggested rule additionally combines the utilitarian
and metaphysical lines of analysis into a single test, and
thereby facilitates a uniform approach to cruel and unusual
punishment analysis. Use of a single test rather than multiple
tests would provide greater consistency among federal court
decisions, and would ultimately offer better guidelines to
prison officials regarding constitutionally permissible condi-
tions. Clearer guidelines might in turn reduce the amount of
litigation. Finally, the rule would insure that routine prison
practices'that do not inflict serious harm would not be declared
unconstitutional. This would avoid litigation over discomforts
inevitably incident to incarceration, and would preserve the in-
tegrity of the eighth amendment as a protection against only in-
tolerable conditions of confinement that directly counter the
objectives of the correctional systems.
Overcrowding in American prisons is a severe and growing
problem.114 As the protectors of constitutional rights, the
courts are ultimately responsible for preventing intolerable
conditions of prison confinement, including overcrowding.
While the eighth amendment originally prohibited forms of
physical torture, it must be capable "of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth."'U5 The Rhodes decision un-
fortunately failed to further the eighth amendment analysis ap-
plicable to prison conditions, and contained disturbing
overtones of a return to the judicial deference attitude charac-
teristic of the hands off era. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the eighth amendment "may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.""16
Social psychological findings and media exposure are begin-
ning to enlighten the public regarding the grave consequences
of confining prisoners in crowded institutions. The risks ac-
companying prison overcrowding are far too great for the
Supreme Court not to heed the public's concern. As one fed-
eral judge observed: "A free democratic society cannot cage in-
mates like animals in a zoo or stack them like chattels in a
114. Since 1975, the total number of federal and state prison inmates has
risen by 42 percent. In 1980, the number grew at its fastest rate in three years.
Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 CoRREcTNs 16, 16-17 (1981).
115. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
116. Id. at 378.
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warehouse and expect them to emerge as decent, law abiding,
contributing members of the community. In the end, society
becomes the loser."117
117. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd 525
F.2d 1239 (5th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted, 528 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 539 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
430 U.S. 325 (1977).
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